Macron's new umbrella. France's forward nuclear deterrence and what it means for its allies

On 2 March 2026, at the Île Longue base near Brest, the French president announced a new, extended reading of France's nuclear doctrine: forward deterrence, extending its reach to Paris's European partners. Eight states, including Poland, responded positively, and Romania was invited as the ninth. Contrary to some commentary, this is neither a nuclear umbrella in the sense of a guarantee nor a European version of NATO's nuclear sharing. It is a strategic message in which France recognises the security of Europe as its vital interest while retaining full and exclusive control over the decision to use nuclear weapons. Its value to allies depends on one thing: whether it proves credible in the eyes of Moscow.

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05 september 2026   |   10:58   |   Source: Gazeta Morska   |   Prepared by: dr Łukasz Wyszyński, dr Paweł Kusiak   |   Print

fot. Marine nationale

On 2 March 2026, at the Marine Nationale base of Île Longue near Brest, standing in front of a nuclear-powered submarine bearing the proud name Le Téméraire (The Bold), President Emmanuel Macron de facto announced a new, extended interpretation of France's nuclear deterrence doctrine.

The submarine behind the president carries M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, one of the most unambiguous symbols of the hard power of the French state. France has four such submarines in total, and at least one of them is always on patrol. The second component of French nuclear deterrence is the Rafale multi-role fighter in its B and M versions, capable of carrying ASMP-A cruise missiles. France's total nuclear potential is currently estimated at around 300 warheads, of which around 100 remain ready for immediate use. France declares, however, that it will expand this potential in the coming years.

The essence of the new French nuclear doctrine is summed up in the term Macron used: forward deterrence. It assumes that French nuclear deterrence will cover not only French territory but also the European continent, in effect France's European partner states. In practice this means that France is telling its external environment that the European continent is a space that may be of essential importance to it in a similar degree to its own territory. Through the new reading of its doctrine, France officially declares that it regards its own security as existentially linked to the security of the whole of Europe, thereby granting itself the right to conduct nuclear deterrence on the territory of other European states.

The roots of the idea of forward deterrence

The genesis of forward deterrence is not new. There is a clear continuity between the French approach to nuclear deterrence in the de Gaulle era and the present day. Already during the Cold War, France declared that it would regard the crossing of the West German border and the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into the Benelux countries as a violation of its vital interests.

Modern French diplomacy signalled the possibility of something like forward deterrence more than a decade ago. The Franco-British strategic rapprochement of 1995, when both states recognised their key security interests as inseparably linked, is also significant here. The idea of forward deterrence was promoted with particular vigour during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007-2012. The development of this approach was then justified by the need to respond to changing geopolitical threats, including Russia's unpredictability and the shifting priorities of US policy.

Signals directly foreshadowing the latest changes in French nuclear doctrine, towards the current form of forward deterrence, can be found among others in France's latest National Strategic Review, published in mid-2025. It is a key state document forming the basis of strategic planning. Earlier still, the new French nuclear rhetoric, Macron's rhetoric, had been noticed for instance by the Russians, who diagnosed it as a sign of the slow erosion of what was, from their point of view, a constructive dialogue with France on nuclear security.

The Strategic Review clearly set out the idea of a European dimension of French nuclear deterrence. France already communicated there what Macron repeated in 2026: that its vital interests now have a European dimension, and that French nuclear forces, by their very existence, strengthen the security of Europe. The document also announced the opening of a strategic dialogue with European partners on the role of French deterrence in common security, naturally while preserving the full decision-making independence of France.

Forward deterrence in practice

According to Macron, forward deterrence is to take four basic and to some extent overlapping forms. The first is the participation of European partners in French exercises connected with the use of nuclear weapons. The most likely scenario would be the participation of France's European allies in air operations exercises alongside French aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons. This would be modelled on NATO's Steadfast Noon exercises, conducted within the nuclear sharing programme. The broader conduct of such exercises involves not only aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but also the forces and assets responsible for mission planning, escort and logistical support. For France, such cooperation would also be an opportunity to encourage allies to buy aircraft produced by its own defence industry as more compatible with the French deterrence system.

Another element of French forward deterrence is to be strategic signalling beyond France's borders. It may consist of the temporary and coordinated deployment of some elements of French strategic forces on the territory of partners. Here one can assume the temporary deployment of Rafale fighters at the air bases of European states. This would not automatically mean that nuclear weapons were located outside France, and assessing that variant would be an additional ambiguity for the state being deterred. The basing of French aviation could be temporary, from several days to more than a fortnight or even longer, combined with joint exercises, or it could be rotational. In the latter case it would mean expanding or adapting the infrastructure of partner states to receive such a presence, and consequently Paris using these elements in its nuclear deterrence policy. It should also be remembered that France may, in agreement with the states covered by the doctrine, conduct overflights by its combat groups or, with an aircraft carrier embarking aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, operate naval task groups in the region covered by forward deterrence.

Least likely seems the inclusion in this concept of nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Their naval bases and patrol areas are closely guarded secrets, and calls by such submarines at the ports of partner states in waters such as the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea appear very improbable.

At the declaratory level, the forms of implementing forward deterrence discussed above can be regarded as a new quality in French nuclear strategy. Some even go so far as to claim that forward deterrence amounts de facto to France extending a nuclear umbrella over its European allies. Such opinions, however, go too far. Forward deterrence is neither a nuclear security guarantee nor a form of institutional sharing of nuclear weapons. In the speech constituting the idea, President Macron clearly stressed that French deterrence will remain strictly national and that the decision on any use of nuclear weapons will always belong exclusively to the President of the Republic. He also underlined that forward deterrence in no way means the transfer of nuclear weapons, the sharing of decisions on their use, or any renunciation of French independence. In analysing the concept one must also remember that the essence of French nuclear strategy is deliberate ambiguity: France never defines precisely when it would use nuclear weapons. This posture is meant to increase the adversary's uncertainty. The question is whether it will increase the ally's certainty.

Forward deterrence versus NATO nuclear sharing

In numerous commentaries the new French doctrine is set against NATO's nuclear sharing programme, which has existed since the 1950s. It is therefore worth listing the key similarities and differences between the two concepts. First of all, French forward deterrence is above all a strategic message announcing a projection of force, whereas NATO nuclear sharing is an institutionalised mechanism with its own operational procedures. In both cases the owners of the nuclear weapons are, respectively, France and the United States, and that is probably the most important similarity between the NATO programme and the French doctrinal concept.

On closer analysis, ever clearer differences emerge. The first concerns the level of political decision on the use of nuclear weapons. In the French concept the matter is stated plainly: only the President of France can decide. Within NATO nuclear sharing the decision-making process is constructed differently. The role of the United States is fundamental here and probably greater than the formal framework suggests, but officially the use of the weapons requires NATO's political consent, the technical authorisation of the US president and the operational consent of the host nation's government. This shows a certain collective character of the programme, which was meant to serve specific political functions. Symbols carry enormous weight in politics.

Differences are also visible at the level of access to nuclear weapons. In the French case the sole holder of the weapons is France. Within nuclear sharing the United States physically deploys nuclear weapons in Europe, and the participating countries have aircraft and pilots prepared to use them, so there are also concrete plans for the possible use of these weapons by participating states. Nothing of the kind will exist within the French concept, because it would undermine the assumption of absolute French sovereignty of decision.

Why France needs forward deterrence

Internal French commentaries and analyses of the concept point out that since Brexit France has remained the only member state of the European Union to possess nuclear weapons. That fact alone gives its nuclear potential particular significance for the security and strategic autonomy of the continent. The debate on that autonomy has become necessary above all because of the objective growth of great-power rivalry, the war in Ukraine and the doubts of some European states about the credibility of US guarantees. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, president of the Robert Schuman Foundation, wrote about this in the daily Ouest-France, specifying that Macron's proposal consists not in the Europeanisation of nuclear weapons but in developing a strategic dialogue with European partners, greater political coordination of deterrence, and the possibility of allies taking part in discussions and exercises related to it. The French proposal is not meant to replace NATO or the American nuclear umbrella, but to complement it and strengthen the European pillar of security.

Also worth noting are the remarks of the French analyst Héloïse Fayet in the American Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. She stresses that through forward deterrence France signals that a threat to European states may be interpreted by it as a threat to its vital interests. This means that an attack on a European state could potentially trigger a French nuclear response. The doctrine remains deliberately imprecise: it does not specify in what situations France would regard something as a threat to its vital interests. This is meant to increase the deterrent effect, but also to leave Paris freedom of political decision.

France's decision on a strategic turn, manifested in the development of the forward deterrence doctrine, has many causes. To some extent they are described in French strategic documents, which point to the growing instability of the international system, the relative weakening of the United States and Russia's aggressive, revisionist policy. It may be assumed that the French political and military leadership concluded that the risk of destabilisation of its European partners is relatively high, and that such destabilisation would seriously affect France's own security. At the same time France, like all nuclear powers, and certainly those that acquired nuclear weapons before the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, has no strategic interest in proliferation. A larger number of nuclear-armed states, even theoretically allied ones, may translate into further instability and unpredictability of the system. French strategists have presumably examined a scenario in which states such as Germany, Sweden or even Poland, convinced of the unreliability of nuclear deterrence within NATO and of US guarantees, decide on their own nuclear programmes. Such a situation would not be desirable for France. Additional guarantees in the form of coverage by forward deterrence may therefore be a factor lowering the risk of proliferation in Europe. Indeed, one can encounter the view that NATO nuclear sharing performed a similar function, to some extent, by allowing the United States to manage the nuclear ambitions of its allies.

Regardless of the trends of change in the international system and concerns about proliferation, through forward deterrence France gains a chance to assume the role of Europe's most important security provider, and thereby its leader. At the narrative level, the project fits the long-expressed wish of the United States that Europe should take greater responsibility for its own defence. The United States still declares that its nuclear deterrence covers the European members of NATO, and the French understand their project as a complement to US guarantees. That complement, however, creates a new strategic context, making France an important provider of nuclear deterrence in Europe. France may also exploit this diplomatically, turning the project into a lobbying tool, for instance in pursuit of lucrative defence contracts in partner states. Nor need this have a purely military dimension: in Poland's case, an undertaking certainly attractive to the French is the construction of the country's second nuclear power plant.

Marseille for Wrocław

President Macron officially announced that eight states had responded positively to the French forward deterrence project: Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Romania was invited to join as the ninth. The geographical location of these states in itself shows the scope of forward deterrence, that is the area whose stability France considers strategically important. Participation in the project may be beneficial to France's partners in many respects. The most important gain is of course an additional guarantee that must affect Russia's strategic calculations, another added value to be taken into account when simulating escalation.

On the other hand, might the Russians not regard the emergence of this programme as evidence of NATO's erosion? If NATO and American deterrence were fully credible, France would not be changing its doctrine and European states would not be welcoming it with hope. The strategic ambiguity we observe here may, unfortunately, have different faces. Then there is the question of the credibility of the guarantees themselves. The Russians have so far regarded French nuclear deterrence as even more credible than the British, given its greater technological and political independence. But will that also apply to the European area? And will forward deterrence be equally credible if the 2027 presidential election in France is won by a candidate of the National Rally?

– Only if a madman who hates his own country sits in the White House will America decide to strike in defence of Europeans, sacrificing a notional Boston for a notional Poznań – the influential pro-Kremlin expert Sergei Karaganov said a few years ago.

In the context of forward deterrence, someone like Karaganov will surely one day ask whether France is ready to sacrifice Marseille for, say, Wrocław. Because Russia will do everything to undermine the credibility of the French doctrine.

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odstraszanie nuklearne Emmanuel Macron NATO nuclear sharing paweł kusiak łukasz wyszyński

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