Kaliningrad in Moscow’s shadow. Russia’s fortress, NATO and the future of Baltic security

CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow is attracting attention not only because of the state of relations between the United States and Russia. Its significance should also be considered in the broader context of northern European security, including the growing strategic importance of the Baltic Sea. For Poland, the Kaliningrad region is of particular importance. For decades, it has been one of Russia’s most important military areas on the Baltic. As the regional balance of power changes, the importance of the Polish Navy, NATO’s presence and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure is also growing.

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25 august 2026   |   21:06   |   Source: Gazeta Morska   |   Prepared by: Kamil Kusier   |   Print

fot. Balon Greyjoy / Wikimedia

The visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow on August 25, 2026, is an event worth following not only through the lens of current US Russian relations. As the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Ratcliffe is the highest ranking representative of the US intelligence community, and his direct presence in the Russian capital shows that even amid deep rivalry between Washington and Moscow, there remains a need to maintain direct channels of communication. According to available information, Ratcliffe met in Moscow with representatives of Russian security structures, although the detailed scope of the talks has not been made public. The visit should not, however, be treated as an event detached from the broader European security environment.

It is precisely in this wider context that the Baltic Sea becomes particularly important. In recent years, the region has undergone a significant strategic transformation. Russia remains one of the most important states on the Baltic, with the Kaliningrad region and the Baltic Fleet among its key assets. However, following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, almost the entire Baltic Sea is now surrounded by Alliance member states. From a security perspective, this creates an entirely new environment in which Russia’s military presence must be considered alongside a much stronger NATO presence and greater Allied capabilities.

Kaliningrad has always been strategic for Russia

Kaliningrad is not a new element of Russian security policy. For decades, it has remained one of the most important points of Russia’s military presence in Europe, with its significance stemming primarily from its geography. The Russian exclave lies between Poland and Lithuania, without a direct land connection to the rest of the Russian Federation, while also having access to the Baltic Sea and the port of Baltiysk, one of the key basing locations for the Russian Baltic Fleet.

For Moscow, this makes the region more than simply Russian territory. It is also a forward military outpost. Forces, military infrastructure, air defence systems and strike capabilities deployed in the region allow Russia to project military power across a significant part of the Baltic Sea and its surrounding airspace. From the perspective of Russian strategy, Kaliningrad has another important advantage. It allows Moscow to maintain a military presence in the immediate vicinity of NATO member states.

It would therefore be misleading to present Kaliningrad today as a place that has only recently gained strategic importance. It has always been important. What has changed is the environment in which Russia uses its strategic position. With NATO’s expansion across the northern Baltic and the increased military presence of Allied states, the importance of Kaliningrad to Russia’s security system has grown even further.

For the Kremlin, it is one of the key points from which the situation in the region can be monitored and military influence maintained. At the same time, for NATO and the states of the region, Kaliningrad remains an area whose military capabilities must be continuously taken into account in defence planning.

A new balance of power in the Baltic

The biggest change of recent years has been the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The decisions by Helsinki and Stockholm have transformed the strategic map of the entire Baltic Sea. Countries that remained outside the Alliance for decades have become full NATO members, and their geographic position is of enormous importance for monitoring and controlling the Baltic maritime environment.

Today, the overwhelming majority of countries bordering the Baltic Sea are NATO members. Russia remains the exception, while retaining two particularly important areas, the vicinity of St Petersburg and the Kaliningrad region. In this situation, Kaliningrad becomes an even more important element of Russia’s security architecture because it allows Moscow to maintain a military presence within a sea largely surrounded by NATO members.

This does not mean, however, that the Baltic has become a sea where an inevitable conflict should be expected. On the contrary, one of the fundamental purposes of increased NATO presence is deterrence and stability. The better Alliance members understand the maritime environment, the faster they can detect potential threats and the greater their ability to act together, the less likely it is that an adversary will attempt to exploit a local advantage.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic should therefore be viewed not as preparation for war, but as an element of building security and predictability. In the case of Russia, the key principle is that a potential adversary must understand that any serious violation of regional security would trigger a coordinated response from the entire Alliance.

Why Poland needs a stronger navy

Poland occupies a particularly important position in this strategic picture. The country has more than 770 kilometres of coastline, two strategic port complexes in Gdansk and Gdynia, expanding energy infrastructure and a growing number of critical infrastructure assets connected to the sea. For Poland, the Baltic is not only a border. It is also one of the country’s most important areas of economic development.

The development of the Polish Navy therefore cannot be treated as a purely military undertaking. Poland needs capabilities for maritime surveillance, protection of its own infrastructure, safeguarding communication routes, mine countermeasures, protection of port facilities and cooperation with its Allies. It also needs ships capable of operating in an environment where an adversary possesses modern surveillance systems, missiles, aircraft and electronic warfare capabilities.

Polish naval modernisation programmes, including the construction of the Miecznik frigates, should therefore be viewed in broader terms than simply the number of ships ordered. Poland needs to build an entire structure of maritime capabilities, from surface and submarine forces, through naval aviation and unmanned reconnaissance systems, to port infrastructure, logistics and command and control systems.

A modern navy is not simply a collection of warships. It is part of a larger system in which data, intelligence, communications, aviation, satellites, unmanned systems and Allied cooperation are equally important.

NATO must remain increasingly present in the Baltic

The same approach should be applied to NATO’s presence. The fact that most Baltic states belong to the Alliance does not mean that security is guaranteed once and for all. A permanent presence, exercises, surveillance and the ability to respond rapidly are required.

This is why initiatives such as Baltic Sentry are important. The operation is aimed at strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure in the Baltic and improving the Alliance’s situational awareness. Ships, aircraft and other surveillance assets are involved in these activities. NATO is increasingly treating the security of underwater infrastructure as an integral part of the security of the entire Alliance.

This represents an important shift. Until recently, maritime security was associated primarily with the protection of ports and shipping routes against conventional military threats. Today, telecommunications cables, energy connections, pipelines, offshore infrastructure and navigation systems must also be taken into account.

The Baltic has therefore become an area where the boundary between military and economic security is increasingly difficult to distinguish.

A sea that must be watched

This has particular importance for Poland. A significant part of the country’s energy and economic security is connected to the sea, while the role of its ports is expected to increase in the coming years. The development of terminals, maritime transport, offshore energy and energy infrastructure also means a growing number of assets that must be protected.

This is not only about the scenario of an open military conflict. Modern hybrid activities may involve GPS interference, surveillance of infrastructure, cyber operations, information operations or attempts to exert pressure on companies responsible for critical infrastructure. Damage to a cable or installation may be accidental, but it could also become part of a broader operation.

Baltic states therefore need more than simply a larger number of warships. They also need a system capable of answering one question as quickly as possible: what is happening at sea?

Situational awareness will be one of the most important elements of Baltic security in the coming decades.

Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Gap

Any analysis of regional security must also take into account the Suwalki Gap. The area connects the Baltic states with the rest of NATO territory, while lying between Belarus and the Kaliningrad region.

This does not mean that every scenario involving Kaliningrad would automatically involve the Suwalki Gap. Its importance stems from the geography of the region. In the event of a serious security crisis, maintaining the connection between Poland and Lithuania would be an important element of NATO’s ability to ensure the free movement of forces and supplies between the northern and southern parts of its eastern flank.

Kaliningrad is therefore important not only because it lies on the Baltic Sea. Its significance also stems from the way its geographical position affects the security of the entire north eastern part of Europe.

John Ratcliffe in Moscow and the broader picture

It is in this context that it is worth returning to the visit of John Ratcliffe to Moscow. There is no basis for claiming that the Baltic or Kaliningrad was the main subject of the talks. Nor is there any basis for building a broader theory of new arrangements concerning regional security on the basis of the visit.

Something else can nevertheless be observed. In a world where relations between Russia and the West remain extremely difficult, maintaining direct channels of communication between key security structures has value in itself. Intelligence services, much like diplomacy, need the ability to exchange information, communicate messages and assess the intentions of the other side.

For the countries of Central and Northern Europe, however, the important point is that regardless of the subjects discussed between Washington and Moscow, Russia’s military presence in the Baltic remains a fact. Kaliningrad remains strategically important to Russia, the Baltic Fleet remains part of Russian military capabilities, and NATO must take both factors into account in its defence planning.

The visit of John Ratcliffe does not therefore change the geography of the region itself. It may, however, serve as another reminder that European security requires two things at the same time, the ability to deter and the ability to communicate.

Poland cannot turn its back on the sea

For many years, Polish security policy was focused to a significant extent on the land component of NATO’s eastern flank. This is understandable, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and the importance of the border with Belarus.

That cannot, however, mean marginalising the Baltic. The sea is one of the fundamental dimensions of Poland’s security, and its importance will grow alongside the development of ports, offshore energy and critical infrastructure.

Poland therefore needs a strong navy, but also a greater NATO presence, an expanded surveillance system, better protection of underwater infrastructure and close cooperation between all countries in the region. It also needs to develop the ability to monitor the maritime environment using modern unmanned systems, aircraft, satellites and sensors deployed both on land and at sea.

This is not about militarising the Baltic for the sake of militarisation. It is about ensuring that any potential adversary understands that an attempt to destabilise the region will be detected immediately and that NATO’s response will be rapid and coordinated.

The Baltic will become increasingly important

Kaliningrad will remain one of the most important points of Russia’s military presence in the region. Not because its significance has only emerged now, but because the environment in which it operates has changed. Following NATO’s expansion to include Finland and Sweden, as well as the Alliance’s increased activity in the Baltic, the Russian exclave finds itself in an entirely new strategic situation.

For Poland, this means the need to continue developing its maritime capabilities and deepening cooperation with its Allies. The Polish Navy must be capable not only of defending the coastline, but also of operating as part of larger NATO operations. Poland should increase its surveillance, mine countermeasure, anti submarine and air defence capabilities, while also developing unmanned systems and the ability to protect critical infrastructure.

The same applies to NATO’s presence. The Baltic is a maritime area where the Alliance must be visible, present and prepared. Exercises, patrols, surveillance and infrastructure protection should not be treated as exceptional activities, but as permanent elements of security policy.

The sea is part of Poland’s security border

The visit of John Ratcliffe to Moscow is an important event in US Russian relations, but its full significance will only become clear once more information emerges about the course and results of the talks. At present, there is no basis for attributing a specific connection between the visit and Kaliningrad or the Baltic.

We can, however, look at the broader picture. Russia continues to maintain a strategic military outpost on the Baltic in the form of the Kaliningrad region. NATO is stronger in the region today than it was several years ago. Finland and Sweden are members of the Alliance. Poland is developing its armed forces, while the importance of maritime infrastructure to the European economy continues to grow.

All of this leads to one conclusion: the Baltic will be one of the most important areas of security for Poland and Northern Europe in the coming decades.

The development of the Polish Navy is therefore neither a luxury nor an addition to defence policy. Nor is it a project intended solely for the military. It is part of protecting Poland’s ports, economy, energy sector, communications and critical infrastructure.

Kaliningrad is a daily reminder of this reality. Russia has long regarded the region as strategic. Poland and NATO must respond not with emotion, but with consistent policy, a greater presence at sea, a stronger navy, better surveillance and even closer Allied cooperation.

Because Baltic security does not begin when a threat appears. It is built beforehand, every day, at sea, in ports, through surveillance systems and through the presence of those responsible for protecting this maritime region.

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