Counter-drone systems and critical infrastructure protection. From detection gaps to system-level integration

At the AMW UAV Forum hosted during the Gazeta Morska Drone Forum, experts gathered for a panel titled "Shield against unmanned systems: Counter-UAS technologies and critical infrastructure protection". The discussion focused on one of the fastest-evolving security domains today: how states and operators can respond to the rapid proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and the emerging threat of coordinated drone attacks. Rather than treating drones as a standalone technological issue, the panel framed them as a systemic challenge-cutting across civil infrastructure, military defense, regulation, and operational readiness.

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25 april 2026 | 09:52 | Source: Gazeta Morska | Prepared by: Kamil Kusier | Print

fot. Krzysztof Miłosz / Akademia Marynarki Wojennej

From isolated incidents to coordinated aerial pressure

A recurring theme was the shift from sporadic drone incidents to sustained, high-volume aerial activity. Dr. Radosław Piesiewicz pointed out that modern conflicts demonstrate a scale that fundamentally changes the defensive problem:

- We are no longer dealing with a single drone in the air. In many cases there are hundreds or thousands of objects that systems must process simultaneously.

He referenced recent operational environments where unmanned systems are deployed in mass, forcing defenders to move beyond traditional one-target engagement logic toward scalable detection and response architectures.

This shift, he stressed, impacts every layer of the system—from sensors to command-and-control infrastructure and kinetic response options.

Detection remains the critical bottleneck

Across the panel, detection was consistently identified as the most sensitive and complex layer of counter-UAS systems.

According to Piesiewicz, the physical characteristics of modern drones create fundamental challenges:

- Small, low-flying and slow-moving objects are extremely difficult to detect reliably.

This limitation is amplified in environments where multiple sensor types must be fused into a coherent operational picture. Radar, RF detection, optical systems, and acoustic sensors all contribute partial information—but none provide full coverage on their own.

The conclusion was clear: only multi-layered, sensor-fusion-driven architectures can provide operationally relevant situational awareness.

Command-and-control as the system’s nervous system

Beyond detection, the ability to process and act on information emerged as a decisive factor.

- The system must process large volumes of incoming data without overwhelming the operator, Radosław Piesiewicz noted.

This places command-and-control (C2) platforms at the centre of counter-drone architectures. Their role is no longer limited to visualization—it now includes filtering, prioritisation, and automation of response chains.

The increasing density of aerial data reinforces the need for decision-support systems capable of reducing cognitive load while maintaining operational accuracy.

Operator limitations and legal boundaries

A more operational and regulatory perspective was provided by Michał Domachowski, who highlighted a key structural constraint: the division between protection and defense.

- As an infrastructure operator, I can protect the facility. I cannot conduct air defense in the military sense.

He stressed that infrastructure operators operate within clearly defined legal frameworks, which limit their ability to respond to higher-tier threats such as military-grade unmanned systems.

This creates what he described as a structural gap between civil protection capabilities and military air defense responsibilities.

At the same time, he emphasized that infrastructure protection must be embedded within a broader national system:

- We need support from the national defense system. Without it, full protection is not achievable.

System readiness versus system fragmentation

Grzegorz Trzeciak approached the issue through the lens of crisis management theory, breaking readiness into four phases: prevention, preparation, response, and recovery.

- The question is not only whether we are prepared, but at which stage we choose to be prepared.

He warned against attempting to achieve uniform readiness across all layers, suggesting instead that resilience should be built through adaptability and recovery capability rather than static preparedness.

A key concern he raised was fragmentation:

- If we try to do everything everywhere, we risk inefficiency and system overload.

Instead, he advocated for realistic allocation of responsibilities across different phases of crisis management.

Evolving threat taxonomy and escalation levels

Michał Domachowski proposed a layered classification of drone threats, ranging from low-cost consumer systems to military-grade platforms.

This taxonomy reflects a key operational reality: not all drones require the same response mechanism.

He distinguished between:

recreational and low-cost systems,
commercial and industrial drones,
and advanced military platforms such as FPV or loitering munitions.

Each category, he argued, demands different detection and neutralisation strategies—from RF jamming to kinetic interception and integration with air defense systems.

- Beyond a certain level, countering drones becomes a task for integrated air defense systems, not facility protection alone.

Neutralisation: cost imbalance and layered response

The panel also addressed the economic asymmetry of counter-drone operations. High-end kinetic interceptors or missile-based systems were widely seen as unsustainable for routine drone threats.

This has led to increasing emphasis on layered neutralisation strategies, including:

RF jamming for low-tier systems,
kinetic solutions for higher-risk objects,
and emerging interceptor drone technologies.

Piesiewicz noted that no single method is sufficient:

- There is no single golden answer to counter-drone warfare.

Integration as the central challenge

Elżbieta Mrozek highlighted a structural gap between technological development and operational integration. While sensor technologies and analytics evolve rapidly, their integration into decision-making systems remains uneven.

- We already have advanced monitoring and analytics, but the challenge is integrating this data into operational decision systems.

She pointed to the difficulty of embedding aerial-domain data into legacy infrastructure management and budgeting systems-originally designed for ground-based security models.

This, she argued, creates a mismatch between available information and actionable decision frameworks.

Offshore and Subsea Infrastructure: A Different Geometry of Risk

Adam Augustyniak (SEA Global) stressed that critical infrastructure protection cannot be limited to land and air domains. Offshore systems introduce an additional layer of complexity linked to the subsea environment and highly integrated energy transmission structures.

He noted that maritime infrastructure is less "mass-scale" than land-based threats, but potentially more consequential in impact:

- If we look at incidents through frequency and impact, subsea infrastructure has a different dynamic-less frequent, but potentially highly consequential.

He pointed out that offshore assets operate across two environments simultaneously: above water and below the surface, as seen in offshore wind farms and their transmission systems. This creates distinct risk vectors for each layer.

- These systems operate in two environments—air and underwater—and each generates different risk vectors.

Adam Augustyniak underlined that beyond protection, a key challenge is rapid recovery after disruption, which becomes a critical operational constraint in offshore settings.

He also emphasized the need for better data integration and cooperation between operators and state systems, especially in early warning and situational awareness:

- Even if an operator cannot respond actively, early information allows continuity procedures to be prepared.

In his view, offshore risks largely mirror those on land, but require a more tailored systemic approach due to environmental complexity and cross-domain integration needs.

Toward dual-use, scalable national architectures

A shared conclusion among participants was the need for scalable, dual-use architectures that function both in peacetime and during crisis escalation.

Mrozek emphasized that future systems should be designed with adaptability in mind:

- We should think in terms of systems that operate in peacetime but can switch into an emergency mode when required.

This reflects a broader shift toward national-level sensor networks capable of supporting both civil monitoring and security operations.

Conclusion: from technology to system coherence

The panel at AMW UAV Forum underscored a key transformation in counter-UAS thinking: the problem is no longer technological availability, but system coherence.

Detection technologies exist. Neutralisation methods are evolving. Data sources are multiplying.

The core challenge now lies in:

integration across operators and state systems,
building interoperable command-and-control structures,
and defining clear operational boundaries between civil protection and military defense.

As the discussion made clear, the future effectiveness of counter-drone systems will depend less on individual technologies and more on the ability to connect them into a functioning national security architecture.